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Income inequality in Germany has been continuously increasing during the past 20 years. In 
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capita incomes, which has repercussions for the income distribution even if wages remain 
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Moreover, a large part of this increase is compensated by the welfare state. 
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Since reuniﬁcation in 1990, inequality as well as poverty and richness of the equiva-
lent disposable income distribution in Germany have increased considerably (see OECD
(2008); Bach, Corneo, and Steiner (2009); Peichl, Schaefer, and Scheicher (2010) and
Figure 1). From a policy perspective it is important to understand the driving forces
behind a widening income gap. If, for instance, the rise in inequality is caused by
a widening of the distribution of market incomes due to a weakening of bargaining
power of unions, the appropriate answer might diﬀer from the one in a situation
where rising inequality is predominantly caused by structural shifts in household
formation due to long-ranging societal trends. The latter explanation is linked to
rising inequality, since a declining average number of individuals living together is
aﬀecting the income distribution as well. This is due to the fact that the analysis
of income distributions is normally based on equivalent income as a proxy for indi-
vidual well-being. In this way, individual incomes can be compared to each other
irrespective of household size. So, what one actually measures is the distribution
of “living standards among artiﬁcial quasi-homogeneous individuals” (B¨ onke and
Schr¨ oder, 2008, p. 2). Furthermore, changing household structure is accompanied
by changes in employment patterns, which themselves have an impact on the distri-
bution of income. Therefore, everything else equal, the income distribution changes
if the household structure changes (see e.g. Burtless (1999, 2009)).1
The aim of this paper is to quantify the eﬀect of such changes on income distri-
bution in Germany. The case of Germany is of special interest for the analysis of the
impact of changing household structure as the demographic development is not only
characterized by incremental ageing, but also by a sharp fall in average household
size. Despite its very pronounced development towards smaller households there
has not been much research that systematically analyzes the eﬀect of demographic
trends on income distribution for Germany. The Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development erroneously reports in its recent study on inequality
(OECD, 2008) that a share of 88% of total (absolute) change in the Gini coeﬃ-
1 For instance average real income per household has decreased by about 2% since 1991, while
equivalent average income has increased by 2% (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008b, p. 147).
1cient of disposable incomes in West Germany from 1985 to 2005 is due to changing
household structure, which would by far be the highest share among OECD coun-
tries. However, in the course of our analysis we were not nearly able to replicate the
OECD’s result. Upon request, the authors of the OECD study conﬁrmed that the
result for Germany is not correct and a misprint.2 Therefore, there is good reason
to re-assess the eﬀect of changing household structures on inequality in Germany.
A priori, it remains unclear in which direction changes of household structure
are aﬀecting the income distribution. The noticeable decline of the number of births,
for example, means that couples nowadays tend to stay childless. This leaves them
with higher equivalent incomes than in a situation with more children. In addition,
this alleviates double-earnership, which makes them even better-oﬀ. Whether this
leads to an increase or a decrease in inequality depends on the average income
position of the related household types. Similarly, the increase in the number of
single households results in a growing number of individuals with lower equivalent
incomes, since they cannot share ﬁxed costs of living expenses. This makes them
worse-oﬀ than in a situation where cohabitation would occur more frequently. Here
again, the eﬀect on income inequality depends on the average income position of the
related household types.
With regard to causality, the described patterns may result from changes in
mating behavior due to higher levels of education and more frequent labor market
participation among (young) women. This could lead to modiﬁcations in scope and
selectivity of fertility. Hence, it is conceivable that household formation behavior in
turn depends on one’s position in the income distribution, i.e. there is some form
of reverse causality. For instance, one can think of educated and employed women
improving their income position which again might coincide with remaining single
for a longer time. In this example, one’s location within the income distribution
aﬀects household formation and vice versa. In addition, demographic change can
have diﬀerent eﬀects on pre and post ﬁsc income distributions depending on the way
how implicit equivalence scales are deﬁned and compensate for diﬀerent household
2So far the OECD has not provided a corrected number for Germany. In our attempt to replicate
their ﬁndings, we get a value of 64% for pre ﬁsc incomes and 14% for disposable incomes when
restricting our sample to West Germany 1985–2005 and applying the same selection criteria and
equivalence scales as in the OECD report.
2behavior. Hence, the tax beneﬁt system can also provide incentives for a certain
behavior, e.g. through the system of joint taxation which provides incentives for a
one-earner family.
In order to assess the impact of the changing household structure between 1991
and 2007, in principle, it is possible to use two diﬀerent methods: subgroup decompo-
sition and re-weighting. The ﬁrst one is an exact decomposition of the distributional
change by population subgroups (Shorrocks, 1980; Mookherjee and Shorrocks, 1982;
Shorrocks, 1984). This is the common approach in studies analyzing the eﬀect of
demographic change on inequality for the United Kingdom (Jenkins, 1995) and the
United States (Martin, 2006). For Germany, this decomposition technique has been
applied to regional diﬀerences in income inequality after reuniﬁcation (Schwarze,
1996). Bargain and Callan (2010) decompose the eﬀects of tax-beneﬁt reforms on
income distribution. In addition to the subgroup decomposition, a re-weighting pro-
cedure in the tradition of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder,
1973) is applied in order to obtain new counterfactual income distributions while
keeping the marginal distributions of other characteristics ﬁxed (Di Nardo, Fortin,
and Lemieux, 1996; Hyslop and Mar´ e, 2005). These procedures have already been
applied by OECD (2008) to assess the importance of demographic change on income
inequality as well as to other contexts that are related to wage and wealth inequality
respectively (Lemieux, 2006; Bover, 2010). Conclusions may then be derived from
a comparison of inequality measures based on the observed income distribution and
on the counterfactual income distribution. Re-weighting and subgroup decomposi-
tion will lead to identical results if the relationship between demographic change
and inequality is linear.
We contrast the results from the subgroup decomposition technique with a
re-weighting approach. Due to the possible existence of non-linearities and as a
sensitivity analysis, we check if both approaches lead to similar results. Note that
both approaches remain descriptive, i.e. based on these results one cannot state that
there is a causal relationship between household structure and income inequality. In
addition to quantifying the impact of changing household structure on inequality,
our paper contributes to the existing literature by deriving analogous decomposition
3techniques for changes in poverty and richness measures. Using these additional
decomposition methods enables us to conduct a more detailed analysis of the tails
of the income distribution. Our analysis is based on data of the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (GSOEP).
The results show to what extent the development of overall inequality, poverty,
and richness may be attributed to changes in household structure and and related
changes in employment behavior. We ﬁnd that the growth of the income gap in
Germany (East and West, 1991–2007) is indeed strongly related to such changes.
For inequality of incomes before taxes and transfers we ﬁnd a fraction of 78%.
However, the result for incomes after taxes and transfers is only 22%. This means
that the welfare state has largely compensated for inequality induced by changes of
household structure. The same holds for the change in poverty, but only to a much
lesser extent for richness measures. Similar results occur when using a counterfactual
re-weighting procedure.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the de-
mographic trend towards smaller households in Germany while Section 3 reviews
relevant deﬁnitions and methods. In Section 4 these methods are applied to Ger-
man survey data. The results are presented in Section 5. The paper is concluding
in Section 6.
2 Demographic Trends in Germany
The demographic development in Germany is not only characterized by incremental
ageing, but also by a sharp fall in average household size, which is now – together
with Sweden – lowest among OECD countries (OECD, 2008, p. 59). Especially
the proportion of one- and two-person households has increased dramatically. The
increase in the number of single households can be primarily explained by a higher
risk of divorce and a lower frequency of marriages. The increase in two-person
households is related to two developments: First, the number of childless couples
has grown and, second, the increase in life expectancy has led to a growing number
of elderly two-person households.
4Place Figure 1 here.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the demographic trend towards smaller households.
The average number of individuals living together in a household has decreased from
2.27 to 2.05 between 1991 and 2008 (by about 9.7 per cent) according to the German
Micro Census 2008. In East Germany this decrease was even twice as large: While
average household size was 2.31 in 1991, there were only less than two individuals
(1.91) sharing a household on average in 2008. This corresponds to a decrease by
17.3%.
Place Figure 2 here.
While population size increased by 2.6% between 1991 and 2008 (from 80.2 to
82.3 million), the number of private households increased by 13.6% to 40.1 million.
This was predominantly driven by the rising number of households with two mem-
bers at most. The number of one- and two-person households increased by 33.2%
and 25.5% respectively while the number of households with at least three members
has been decreasing (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008c).3 To a large part, this devel-
opment can be explained by the drastic and continuous decline of Germany’s birth
rate. In 1991, the number of live births was about 830.000, while there were only
686.000 in 2005. This corresponds to a decrease by 17.4%. The number of births
reached its maximum of 1.36 million in 1964 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008a). In
addition, one can argue that the trend towards individualization due to increasing
relevance of modern life styles such as “living apart together” (see e.g. Asendorpf,
2009) also accounted for a large part of this observation.
3 Methodology: Re-weighting and Decomposition
In this section, we describe methods for the measurement and decomposition of
inequality, poverty, and richness and for re-weighting.
3 Although the trend towards smaller households according to the German Micro Census might
be somewhat overstated due to statistical artifacts (see Statistisches Bundesamt (2009) for details),
the direction and magnitude of this trend nevertheless seem to be clear cut. Moreover, the authors’
calculations based on data from the GSOEP are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (see Figure 1).
53.1 Decomposition Techniques
3.1.1 Inequality
In the literature, there are several measures of inequality (see e.g. Atkinson and
Bourguignon (2000)).4 In the context of our approach, for analyzing the eﬀect of
household structures on income inequality, the class of Generalized Entropy (GE)
inequality measures (Shorrocks, 1980) is the most suitable one. The GE measures
can be decomposed in a way such that total inequality results as the sum of inequality
within and between population subgroups. The class of GE measures is deﬁned for
an income distribution Y = (y1,...,yn), where yi denotes income of individual




i=1) · yi denotes the arithmetic mean of individual incomes.










inequality measures, which is also known as mean logarithmic deviation (Mookherjee
and Shorrocks, 1982, p. 889).5 If one divides total population into K disjoint and
exhaustive subgroups that are denoted by k ∈ {1,...,K} the inequality measure I0






































i∈k wi denotes the weighted number and vk the weighted proportion of indi-
viduals belonging to population subgroup k. The mean income of subgroup k is de-




i∈k wi)·ln(¯ yk/yi). Hence,
total inequality can be written as a weighted sum of inequality within (W) and be-
tween (B) population subgroups. Population ratios vk thereby serve as weighting
4 In addition to a representation of the income distribution with the help of summary measures
there are also more general representations, e.g. graphical ones (see e.g. Jenkins and Van Kerm
(2005)). However, another way of representing our results does not reveal additional ﬁndings.)
5 According to Shorrocks the features of this measure are best suitable for decomposition anal-
ysis, since total inequality can be exactly decomposed into within- and between-group inequality.
Moreover, the weighting factors sum up to unity (Shorrocks, 1980, p. 625).
6factors. Inequality decomposition within and between population subgroups pro-
vides a basis for decomposing the change in total inequality between period t and
t + 1 into changes within population subgroups and changes that result from shift-




































where ∆ is the diﬀerence-operator. In addition, λk = ¯ yk/¯ y denotes the ratio of
population subgroup k’s mean income to total population’s mean income and θk =
vk·λk the income ratio of group k. A symbol with a bar denotes the particular value
averaged over periods t and t + 1.6 Thus, the change in total inequality from one
point in time to the next can be decomposed into four components denoted by A,
B, C and D (Mookherjee and Shorrocks, 1982, p. 897):
Summand A summarizes the eﬀect of inequality changes within population
subgroups (∆I0k). In particular, it contains the contribution of inequality changes
that solely result from changes within population subgroups. It abstracts from
changes in population composition by ﬁxing population ratios on averaged values
(¯ vk). Accordingly, changes in inequality within groups with higher proportions in
population would therefore be of more importance than changes within relatively
small groups.
Summand B on the other hand contains the eﬀect of changes in population
composition (∆vk) on inequality within population subgroups. It analogously ab-
stracts from changes in within-group inequality by ﬁxing it on averaged values (¯ I0k),
since changes in population ratios are crucial for summand B. If, for example, the
6 Alternatively, it would be possible to use base or ﬁnal period weights. However, Mookherjee
and Shorrocks (1982) point out that this choice is unlikely to make a diﬀerence to the results
(p. 896). In addition, this corresponds to the weight that would be assigned by the Shapley value
algorithm (Shorrocks, 1999; Jenkins and Van Kerm, 2005).
7proportions of groups with relative high levels of inequality increase, total inequality
will increase accordingly and vice versa.
Summand C describes the eﬀect of changes in population composition (∆vk),
though, contrary to summand B, on inequality between population subgroups. Again,
changes in population ratios are crucial for the direction of change. It ﬁxes the ra-
tio of group mean incomes to total mean income (λk), which becomes apparent in
the term in squared brackets, although it has no intuitive interpretation for it. So,
summand C sums up the contribution to total inequality change that results when
proportions of groups with relative high or low mean incomes (compared to total
mean income) increase or decrease.
Summand D ﬁnally represents the contribution of changes in population
subgroup mean incomes (∆ln(¯ yk)). It ﬁxes the diﬀerence between group proportions
of total income and population respectively. The change in the logs of population
subgroup mean income is of importance here. The higher the income ratio of a
group relative to its population ratio the larger the eﬀect on total income inequality
when the mean income of that group changes.
In summary: summand A represents changes in pure inequality within popu-
lation subgroups. Since all individuals belonging to a particular group are identical
with respect to certain characteristics, summand A displays changes in inequality
that result from other characteristics (e.g. diﬀerences in education levels aﬀecting
wage and hence income inequality). Summands B and C together represent the
contribution to inequality change resulting from demographic change, since they are
based on shifting population ratios. Summand D represents the eﬀect of changes in
the distribution of population subgroup mean incomes. With respect to the purpose
of this paper, the relative importance of summands B and C compared to total
change in inequality ∆I0 is of prior interest.
3.1.2 Poverty
A well-known and widely used class of poverty measures, which is decomposable
by population subgroups, was introduced by Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984).










for yi ≤ z, (3)
where α ≥ 0 is a parameter of poverty aversion7 and gi = z −yi denotes the income
shortfall between individual i’s income yi and a poverty line z. The number of poor
is denoted by q. They receive an income not exceeding the poverty line z (Foster,
Greer, and Thorbecke, 1984, p. 761 f.).
If one divides the population into K disjoint and exhaustive population sub-





vk · Pα,k(yk;z), (4)
where vk denotes the population share. Subgroup k’s income vector is denoted by yk








for yi∈k ≤ z, where qk denotes the number of poor units within group k. Hence,
total poverty can be expressed as a weighted sum of poverty in population subgroups
with population share weights (Bourguignon and Ferreira, 2005, p. 26).
In order to assess how much of an observed change in total poverty can be
attributed to demographic changes, it is necessary to decompose the change into


















This decomposition of change also corresponds to the one that results from a Shapley
value decomposition (Shorrocks, 1999). So, the change in total poverty (∆Pα) can
be decomposed into the change in levels of group poverty (labeled A) and changes
in the composition of population (demographic change, labeled B).
7 For a larger α there is more emphasis on the “poorest poor” (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke,
1984, p. 763). For α = 0 the measure reveals the head-count index.
93.1.3 Richness
Income richness is a less considered ﬁeld than income poverty. Peichl, Schaefer, and
Scheicher (2010) propose measures that are decomposable by population subgroups
and allow for a consideration of the intensity of aﬄuence analogous to the FGT













for yi ≥ ρ. (6)
Here, β > 0 is a parameter for the sensitivity to intensive richness. For greater
values of β the richness measure puts more weight on the “very rich”. The richness
line is denoted by ρ. Individuals with an income above this line are deﬁned as the
rich in the society. As in the cases of inequality and poverty it is possible to express




vk · Rβ,k(yk;ρ), (7)









for yi∈k ≥ ρ and sk denotes the number of rich within each group.
Analogous to the decomposition of poverty change over time it is straightforward to


















The interpretation of this decomposition is the same as for poverty: summand B is
the fraction of the overall change in richness that is related to demographic change.
3.2 Re-weighting Procedure
In order to assess the impact of the changing household structure between 1991
and 2007, we need to compare the counterfactual distribution of 2007 incomes and
1991 household structure with the observed 2007 income distribution. In order to
10do so, we follow the approach suggested by Di Nardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996)
and extended by Hyslop and Mar´ e (2005) to estimate the counterfactual density
function using a re-weighting technique.
Each individual household can be described by a vector (y,x,t) consisting of an
income y, a vector x of household characteristics, and a date t (1991 or 2007). Each
observation belongs to a joint distribution function F(y,x,t) of income, characteris-
tics and date. The joint distribution of income and characteristics is the conditional
distribution F(y,x|t). The density of income at one point in time, ft(y), can be
written as the integral of the density of income conditional on a set of characteris-




dF(y,x|ty,x = t) =
Z
f(y|x,ty = t)dF(x|tx = t) (9a)
≡ f(y,ty = t,tx = t). (9b)
Since the estimation of counterfactual densities combines diﬀerent dates, the no-
tation in the last line accounts for these. Under the assumption, that the 2007
distribution of incomes, F(y|x,ty = 2007), does not depend on the 1991 distribution
of characteristics, F(x|tx = 1991), the hypothetical counterfactual density is:
f(y,ty = 2007,tx = 1991) =
Z
f(y|x,ty = 2007)dF(x|tx = 1991) (10a)
=
Z
f(y|x,ty = 2007)ψx(x)dF(x|tx = 2007), (10b)





The counterfactual density can be estimated by weighted kernel methods. The
diﬀerence between the actual 2007 density and the hypothetical re-weighted density
represents the eﬀect of changes in the distribution of household’s characteristics.
To estimate the impact of the changing household structure between 1991 and
2007, we compare measures of distribution M(·) for the counterfactual distribu-
11tion of 2007 incomes and 1991 household structure with the observed 2007 income
distribution:
δ = M(f(y,ty = 2007,tx = 2007)) − M(f(y,ty = 2007,tx = 1991)). (12)
4 Empirical Foundation
4.1 Data: The German Socio-Economic Panel Study
The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) is a panel survey of households
and individuals in the Federal Republic of Germany that has been conducted an-
nually since 1984. The study is maintained by the German Institute for Economic
Research (DIW) in Berlin. A weighting procedure allows to make respondents’ data
to be representative for the German population as a whole. A detailed overview
of the GSOEP is provided by Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005) or Wagner, Frick,
and Schupp (2007). Issues concerning sampling and weighting methods or the im-
putation of information in case of item or unit non-response is well documented by
the GSOEP Service Group. We use waves from the GSOEP that contain income
information on an annual basis for the longest possible period 1991–2007, in order
to include East Germany after reuniﬁcation. The data sets contain relevant infor-
mation from 17,921 individual observations in 6,665 survey households for 1991. For
2007, the sample increased to 25,366 individuals and 11,072 households.
4.2 Income Concept
The decomposition of the change in measures of distribution from Equations (2), (5),
and (8) can be computed for any concept of income. We compute it for equivalent
pre ﬁsc incomes and are also are interested in post ﬁsc incomes. The progressive
German tax-beneﬁt system induces an inequality-reducing redistribution of incomes
and by and large takes into account household structures of tax-payers and recipients
of beneﬁts respectively. Looking at pre- and post ﬁsc incomes allows us to assess to
what extent the German tax beneﬁt system compensates for changes in household
12structure.
Data sets from the GSOEP contain appropriate income variables that are
deﬁned as follows (Grabka, 2007, p. 41 f.): A household’s pre ﬁsc income consists of
labor earnings, asset ﬂows, private retirement income and private transfers from all
household members. A household’s post ﬁsc income encompasses pre ﬁsc income,
public transfers, and social security pensions from all household members minus
total tax-payments of all household members. Both concepts of income are deﬂated
in order to compute real incomes. Moreover, we add household imputed rental
values for owner-occupied housing, which is common in empirical research (Yates,
1994; Canberra Group, 2001; Smeeding and Weinberg, 2001; Frick and Grabka, 2003;
Eurostat, 2006). For population weights wi we use the according weights from the
GSOEP (Grabka, 2007, pp. 181 ﬀ.). In the following analysis, we deﬁne the poverty
line z to be 60% and the richness line ρ is deﬁned as 200% of the median of equivalent
pre- and post government incomes respectively.8
Computations are conducted as follows: individual incomes yi are equivalent
pre and post ﬁsc incomes respectively. Our main results that are presented and
discussed in Section 5 rely on calculations using the modiﬁed OECD equivalence
scale assigning a weight of one to the ﬁrst adult household member, a weight of
0.5 to every additional adult, and a weight of 0.3 to every child (OECD, 2005). In
Section 5.1.2 we discuss the role of the choice of equivalence scale and present results
obtained for alternative speciﬁcations of the equivalence scale.
4.3 Deﬁnition of Population Subgroups
Like the deﬁnition of an income concept, a deﬁnition of how to divide a popula-
tion into disjoint and exhaustive subgroups is of great importance for the following
analysis.9 According to our research question, household composition with respect
8 Alternative deﬁnitions of the poverty and richness line respectively do not alter the qualitative
ﬁndings of our analysis or the interpretation of our results.
9 Note that, compared to the population in private households, the population in institution-
alized households is underrepresented in the GSOEP (Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005, p. 182 f.).
This may be selective with respect to household composition and poverty risks. Due to increasing
longevity more and more elderly can be assumed to move into nursery and old age homes, i.e. the
bias may have increased over time. However, since there is no information available for this group,
we refer to the population in private households only.
13to number and age of household members is of relevance. As we already pointed
out, household formation is also related to labor market participation. Hence, in
order to capture these eﬀects, our deﬁnition of population subgroups proceeds in two
steps: In a ﬁrst step, we distinguish population subgroups according to two criteria:
The ﬁrst criterion is the number of adult household members (aged 18 or over), the
second one is the presence of children (younger than 18) in the household. In a sec-
ond step, we further distinguish these groups according to the number of employed
persons within the household as a third criterion. Diﬀerences in the results for the
subgroup decomposition (see next section) are related to changing patterns in labor
force participation. However, we cannot identify the causal eﬀect thereof since this
is already partly captured by household structure because household formation and
labor force behavior can be viewed as a joint decision.
In the ﬁrst step, we distinguish between singles, couples, and households with
more than three adult members. We further split up our distinction into house-
holds with and without children of minor age. I.e., in total we have six population
subgroups according to household composition (see Table 1).
Place Table 1 here.
It appears that between 1991 and 2007 the population shares of three of these
groups increased, while they decreased for the remaining groups. Single households
made up about 16% of the population in 1991 and up to 2007 this share increased
to 20%. The largest group in 2007 is represented by individuals living in two-adult-
households. Their share increased from 26% to over 30%. Hence, in 2007 more
than half of the population lived in households with one or two adults and with-
out children. In addition, the share of individuals in single households increased
from 2.8% to about 3.7%. Other types of households are on the retreat. Especially
the proportion of individuals in two-adult households with children decreased from
nearly one third by nearly seven percentage points. Note that those groups with
growing population shares are characterized by above average (and growing) levels
of income inequality. Moreover, their group mean incomes display much more vari-
ation around the population’s mean. I.e. we observe that an increasing share of the
14population is becoming more heterogenous in terms of within-group as well as in
terms of between-group inequality.
The declining relative number of individuals in group 6, i.e. living in households
with several adults and children, partly means that multiple generation-households
as a form of cohabitation obviously is on the retreat in Germany: According to the
GSOEP, the proportion of individuals in multiple generation-households decreased
from 2.4% to 1.3% between 1991 and 2007 and hence can be seen as a marginal
phenomenon. This retreat is assumed to contribute to increasing income inequal-
ity because of the diminishing incidence of redistribution within households. This
is existent when the oldest and youngest generations, i.e. those most in need of
redistribution, cohabit with the working-age generation. Hence, to the degree to
which this form of cohabitation is reduced, there will be less redistribution within
the household and accordingly more inequality.
The deﬁnition of subgroups of the second step takes into account the em-
ployment status of household members. Hence, we further split up the beforehand
deﬁned groups based on the number of employed persons in the household. We now
have 16 groups in total. In Table 2 we present the group characteristics in terms of
population shares, mean incomes, and measures of income distribution.
Place Table 2 here.
It becomes apparent that population subgroups deﬁned according to house-
hold structure only are internally quite heterogenous and there is much variation in
mean incomes. This is not surprising, since additional employed household members
tend to increase household earnings. About three quarters of the percentage point
increase in the number of single households is accounted for by employed singles,
while most of the relative growth of two-adult households without children is due




In this subsection we present the decomposition results for diﬀerent measures, in-
come concepts, and regions.10 We ﬁrst discuss our results for the subgroup decom-
position based on the deﬁnition of population subgroups according to household
structure and employment status and then compare these to results from a decom-
position analysis for subgroups distinguished by household structure only.
5.1.1 Inequality
The results for the decomposition of income inequality change according to Equa-
tion (2) are displayed in Table 3. For pre ﬁsc incomes overall inequality in reuniﬁed
Germany has increased by about 25% between 1991 and 2007. About 19.4 percent-
age points of this change can be attributed to changes in household structure and
employment status (summands B and C). This corresponds to 77.5% of the overall
increase in pre ﬁsc income inequality.
Noticeably, although the contribution of summand B is somewhat larger in
magnitude, both summands B and C contribute to this result. Summand B de-
scribes the eﬀect of the change in population structure on within-group inequality
while summand C captures the eﬀect of changing population structure on between-
group inequality. Obviously, population subgroups that are characterized by smaller
household size exhibit greater within-group inequality than others over time. Thus,
the increase in relative size of these groups has considerably contributed to the over-
all increase in income inequality. Moreover, these groups have mean incomes quite
diﬀerent from the overall mean. Hence, their growth contributes to increasing in-
10 Note that the decomposition results according to Equations (2), (5), and (8) are presented
as percentages and percentage points respectively. For example, ∆I0 and the summands A to D
are divided by It
0 and multiplied by 100 each. The fraction B+C
∆I0 is multiplied by 100. The same
holds analogously for the decompositions of poverty and richness. The diﬀerentiation into East
and West Germany is appropriate as there are still signiﬁcant income diﬀerentials between the two
parts of the country. The non-convergence of income inequality is indirectly explained by much
higher rates of unemployment in East Germany which causes a high level of inequality in labor
income, which is of greater importance relative to capital income in East Germany (Frick and
Goebel, 2008, p. 571). In addition, as becomes clear from Figure 1, the demographic trend is more
pronounced in the East.
16equality irrespective of increasing heterogeneity within groups. At the same time,
the contribution to inequality growth from summand A, which comprises changes
in within-group inequality, is quite pronounced as well. This clearly indicates that
population subgroups deﬁned by household composition have become more het-
erogenous over time. This is especially true for the largest part of the population,
i.e. those people living in one- or two-person households.
Place Table 3 here.
In West Germany, pre ﬁsc income inequality has increased by 16.3% between
1991 and 2007, less than in the whole of Germany. The proportion of summands B
and C (83%) is even larger. The increase in overall pre ﬁsc inequality in East Ger-
many since reuniﬁcation in 1991 (about 70%) is much more pronounced than in the
West. Shrinking household size makes up 76% of the overall increase in Germany’s
“new states”. Note that in 2007 inequality in East Germany is higher for pre ﬁsc
incomes compared to the West, while it is lower for post ﬁsc incomes. The interpre-
tation of this pattern is related to considerably diﬀerent levels of unemployment in
both parts of the country: In East Germany, the unemployment rate is on average
nearly twice as high as it is in the West. Hence, the proportion of people whose pre
ﬁsc income, i.e. without transfer payments, is close to zero is much higher there,
so the relevance of higher unemployment is clearly to be considered as a “driving
force” for pre ﬁsc income inequality in Eastern Germany.
Our results for post ﬁsc income inequality decomposition show that the eﬀect of
changing household structures is less pronounced than for pre ﬁsc income inequality.
Altogether, post ﬁsc income inequality has increased by 37.8% which is larger than
the increase for pre ﬁsc income, although the level of inequality is still much lower
for post ﬁsc incomes than for pre ﬁsc incomes. The proportion of summands B
and C amounts to 22.2% between 1991 and 2007 which is signiﬁcantly lower than
for pre ﬁsc income. This results implies that the German tax-beneﬁt system takes
into account household structure and compensates for most (not all) of inequality
increases that can be related to demographic changes. Poorer people tend to have
more children than rich people and especially among the latter fertility is declining
the most. The implicit equivalence scales in the tax beneﬁt system rather generously
17compensate for the presence of children (Fuest, Niehues, and Peichl, 2010) and,
hence, the relative position of the poor is getting better. Furthermore, due to the
highly progressive income tax system, a large fraction of the increasing income of
double earner couples is taxed away which leads to post ﬁsc inequality increasing
less than pre ﬁsc inequality. Looking at West Germany separately reveals that the
proportion of summands B and C between 1991 and 2007 (15.9%) is lower than
for Germany as a whole. In East Germany, income inequality has grown by 38.8%.
Summands B and C account for about 16.8%.
The results discussed beforehand are based on the deﬁnition of population
subgroups according to household structure and employment status. This deﬁnition
allows to capture eﬀects of labor market participation and household size that are
related to household formation. In order to get an idea of the relative importance of
changing household size only, we now present results based on the narrower deﬁnition
of subgroups which ignores the employment status of the household. The according
results are presented in Table 3, lower panel . Their characteristics in terms of
population share, mean incomes, and group-speciﬁc measures of income distribution
are listed in Table 1 (see above).
We ﬁnd that the relative importance of demographic change turns out to be
somewhat smaller in magnitude. For pre ﬁsc incomes we have a fraction of 61.4%
for summands B and C (West: 73%, East: 50.5%), for post ﬁsc incomes we have
17.4% (West: 13.3%, East: 21%). Hence, without accounting for the employment
status, the explanatory contribution of household structure is reduced by 16.1 (4.8)
percentage points for pre (post) ﬁsc incomes. These diﬀerences are due to smaller
importance of summand C. This means, shifts in population shares play a minor role
for increasing between-group inequality. This is not surprising for this speciﬁcation
of population subgroups since there is not as much variation within groups with
similar household structure but diﬀerences in labor market participation.
For this speciﬁcation of subgroups summand B almost solely accounts for
the joint proportions of summands B and C (see Table 3). Hence it seems as
if summand C, i.e. the eﬀect of changing population structure on between-group
inequality, plays no role at all. However, this is only true on the aggregate level.
18Note that summands A to D are themselves aggregations over population subgroups
(see Equation 2). So, if one of them turns out to be of small magnitude or even close
to zero, this does not necessarily imply that the contribution of each single group
to this particular summand is close to zero, too. It could rather be the case that
some groups’ contributions are large in magnitude but with a negative sign while
others’ contributions have a positive sign and so both eﬀects are oﬀset. The latter
is exactly what we ﬁnd for summand C. Table 4 displays the contributions of each
single population subgroup to the components of inequality change for pre- and post
ﬁsc incomes respectively.11
Place Table 4 here.
It becomes apparent that for both summands B and C the results presented in
Table 4 are mainly “driven” by certain subgroups. Not surprisingly, especially the
growth of groups 1 and 3 (single- and two-adult-households) is positively contribut-
ing to overall inequality change, since these are the only ones with noticeably growing
proportions among the population. Another group with a smaller but still positive
contribution is group 2 (single parent households). These groups exhibit above-
average and increasing levels of inequality, within as well as between subgroups (see
Table 1). That is why their contributions to summands B and C are disproportion-
ably large. Increasing heterogeneity within the group of single-households is due to
the fact that nowadays this group is no more dominated by elderly people (pension-
ers, widows) with low pension incomes but more and more also consists of young-
and middle-aged at diﬀerent positions in their educational or professional careers.
So heterogeneity in incomes partly comes from more heterogeneity in age. Moreover,
income inequality is comparatively high among single-households, because they are
not able to re-distribute income within the household, while multi-person households
share resources and hence individual household members’ income shocks, e.g. due
to unemployment or retirement, can be cushioned.
11 Note that according to Equation (2) it holds that Ak = ¯ vk · ∆I0k, Bk = ¯ I0k · ∆vk, Ck = h
¯ λk − ln(λk)
i
· ∆vk, and Dk =
 ¯ θk − ¯ vk

· ∆ln(¯ yk).
195.1.2 Role of the Equivalence Scale
In Section 4.2 we stated that we use the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale to ob-
tain equivalent incomes. However, the choice of equivalence scale is not irrelevant
with respect to our research question. E.g. inequality rankings in cross-country
comparison are sensitive to diﬀerent values of the equivalence-scale elasticity (Buh-
mann, Rainwater, Schmaus, and Smeeding, 1988; Hagenaars, de Vos, and Zaidi,
1994; Ebert and Moyes, 2003; B¨ onke and Schr¨ oder, 2008). In addition, it is possible
not only to control for size and age of household members, but also for health-
related needs (Burchardt and Zaidi, 2005). Most of the equivalence scales (ES)
used in practice (e.g. Cowell and Jenkins (1994) and Burkhauser, Smeeding, and
Merz (1996)) can be written in the general form of
ES = (θ1 + θ2 · NA + θ3 · NC)
γ, (13)
where θ1 denotes an extra weight for the (adult) head of the household and θ2
denotes the weight for (additional) adult household members (NA) and θ3 denotes
the weight of children (NC, see e.g. Cutler and Katz (1992); Banks and Johnson
(1994)). For smaller values of the parameter γ the importance of economies of scale
in household consumption increases.12
Place Table 5 here.
In order to make sure that these results are not due to a speciﬁc choice of equivalence
scale we calculated the fraction of summands B and C for the inequality decom-
position for various speciﬁcations of the general form of the equivalence scale in
Equation 13. The results for both deﬁnitions of population subgroups are presented
in Table 5. We ﬁnd that the choice of equivalence scale does not alter the results
signiﬁcantly. Not surprisingly, it turns out that the proportion of the demographic
eﬀect is somewhat larger in speciﬁcations when large economies of scale are assumed
(i.e. for smaller values of γ). Moreover, we ﬁnd that even for per-capita incomes,
12 Note that for θ1 = θ2 = 0.5, θ3 = 0.3, and γ = 1 we arrive at the modiﬁed OECD scale,
for θ1 = 0, θ2 = θ3 = 1, and γ = 0.5 at the square-root scale, while using a scale with θ1 = 0,
θ2 = θ3 = 1, and γ = 1 is equivalent to using per-capita incomes, i.e. assuming no economies of
scale.
20i.e. in the absence of scale economies, a quite sizeable fraction of inequality change
(60%/77% for pre and 17%/21% for post ﬁsc income) can be attributed to changing
household and employment structure.
5.1.3 Poverty and Richness
The results for the decomposition of poverty (Equation (5)) and richness (Equation
(8)) change are presented in Table 6. Note that we restrict our analysis to post ﬁsc
incomes which is the measure usually used as a proxy for well-being in the context of
poverty (and richness) analysis. Moreover, these results are based on the deﬁnition
of population subgroups according to household structure and employment status.
Below we present the according results for subgroups based on household structure
only and brieﬂy discuss the role of certain groups.
Place Table 6 here.
For post ﬁsc incomes, the demographic eﬀect on poverty change sums to more
than half of total change (between 50.3 and 75.1%). The richness measures for post
ﬁsc incomes increased quite considerably between 1991 and 2007 by more than 76%
for β = 1 and by two thirds for β = 3. The head count ratio for richness (HC)
increased by more than 46%. The considerable growth of income richness coincides
with increasing values of inequality measures which are more sensitive to changes in
the upper tail of the income distribution (see inequality measures Ic for higher values
of the parameter c in Table 8). Frick and Grabka (2010) provide evidence for the
increasing relevance of (net) income from returns on investments, i.e. from capital
income and from imputed rent for owner-occupied housing (also see Section 4.2).
This source of income is especially concentrated in top income households. Based
on the same data and for the same period of time, they ﬁnd a dampening eﬀect
of imputed rent on inequality, while capital income clearly contributes to rising
inequality. Since both income types serve as old-age provision in addition to public
pensions it is not surprising that – in the light of an ageing society in Germany –
we ﬁnd evidence for more concentration at the top of the income distribution.
21The fraction of overall post ﬁsc richness change that can be attributed to
demographic changes amounts to minuscule values between −1% and 2%. Hence, we
ﬁnd that changing population structure contributed literally nothing to the change
in income richness. However insigniﬁcant, the result for the richness headcount
below zero means that changing population structure even marginally dampened
the growth in richness. I.e. those groups with relatively high levels of richness are
becoming smaller while “poorer” groups with low levels of richness are growing.
In Table 6, lower panel, we also present results of the decomposition for poverty
and richness based on the distinction of population subgroups according to house-
hold structure only. Although the resulting values for the fraction of summand B are
smaller in magnitude the picture is qualitatively the same: The proportion amounts
to values between 35.8% and 37.5% in case of income poverty and between 7.4% and
9% in case of richness. I.e. changing patterns in household formation contributed
much more to the growth at bottom than to the upper tail of the income distribu-
tion. If one looks at a disaggregation of the poverty and richness decompositions
respectively, i.e. examining the contributions of each single population subgroups
it turns out that again the population subgroups of one- and two-adult as well as
single parent households are those positively contributing to summand B, while the
others’ contributions have a negative sign (see Table 7).
Place Table 7 here.
This means, one can reason that the observed increase in relative poverty
rates is not only related to increasing poverty rates within groups, but to a large
extent also to the growth of population groups with above average levels of poverty
(37.5%, see Table 6). E.g. single households and even more single parent households
are characterized by a poverty rate of 24 and 43% (in 1991) respectively. In 2007
nearly every second individual, many of them children, living in a single parent
household is considered as poor. However, less than 10% of the sizeable increase
of overall richness measures are related to changes in population structure. I.e. the
increase in richness is more due to increasing richness within groups rather than the
growth of “rich” population subgroups.
225.2 Re-weighting
Since we are interested in the eﬀect of changing household structure on income dis-
tribution over time, we want to compare the actual change in values of distributional
measures to the change that would have occurred when household structure would
have remained unchanged between the base period of our analysis (the year 1991)
and the most recent period available (2007), everything else equal. To do so, one
has to assign counterfactual population weights to the sample population of 2007
in order to arrive at a marginal distribution of household structure identical to the
one in 1991.
As it is pointed out in subsection 3.2 this is done by re-deﬁning population
weights by multiplying the actual population weights with a re-weighting factor that
is equal to the ratio of the population shares in the base and ﬁnal period. Formally,












i · ψx(x), (14)
where w2007
i denotes the actual population weight of individual i in 2007 and vk,i
denotes the population share of subgroup k to which individual i belongs. The
re-weighting function ψx(x) reduces to the fraction of population shares in case of
not controlling for further characteristics. Hence, if individual i belongs to a group
whose share increased between 1991 and 2007, the re-weighting factor is smaller
than one and its weight is downsized. It is enlarged if the re-weighting factor is
greater than one, i.e. the respective subgroup’s population share has decreased. This
way of re-weighting has been applied in the OECD report (OECD, 2008, p. 66) in
order to calculate counterfactual changes in income inequality assuming a constant
population structure with respect to household and age structure respectively.13
We apply this type of re-weighting for Germany and report calculations for
diﬀerent GE inequality measures (I0, I1, and I2) as well as for the Gini coeﬃcient
13It would be possible to include additional controls in the reweighting procedure. However,
when doing so, we ﬁnd rather similar results (available upon request). Therefore, in order to make
the reweighting procedure and the decomposition approach directly comparable, as well as in order
to compare our results to OECD (2008) we concentrate on simple reweighting here. Note that this
also corresponds to the ﬁrst counterfactual in the analysis of Hyslop and Mar´ e (2005).
23(IGini) and the measures for poverty and richness that were already introduced in
the previous sections. We compute how large the change in measures of distribution
would have been if the marginal distribution of household structure would not have
changed between 1991 and 2007. Table 8 reports several measures of inequality,
poverty, and richness and distinguished between pre and post ﬁsc incomes. We














Mact,07 − Mact,91 . (17)
This term denotes the share of the changing household structure in the total change
of the respective measure M ∈ {I,P,R}. Note that it would equal zero if the
re-weighted counterfactual value in 2007 would resemble the actual one (Mact,07 =
Mrew,07). In this case, the changing household structure would not aﬀect the change
at all. In the other extreme case the term would equal 100% if the re-weighted value
of the measure under consideration in 2007 would be equal to the actual value of the
base year 1991 (Mrew,07 = Mact,91). Then the household structure would be related
to the total change of the measure. The results are displayed in Table 8, which
reveals that the share of changing household structure varies between measures for
poverty (highest), inequality (medium), and richness (lowest) and between pre and
post ﬁsc incomes respectively.
Place Table 8 here.
For the re-weighting procedure, one can summarize that actual growth rates of
the measures of distribution – without exception – are larger than the counterfactual
re-weighted growth rates for pre ﬁsc as well as for post ﬁsc incomes. In other words,
24the results of our re-weighting procedures state that inequality, poverty, and richness
would not have increased as much as they actually did if there would have been no
trend towards smaller households. According to our results, up to 80% of the rise
in inequality in terms of pre ﬁsc incomes may be attributed to changes in household
size alone, not accounting for additional changes in employment behavior.
6 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to quantify the eﬀect of continuously decreasing average
household size on measures of income distribution in Germany. By means of a re-
weighting procedure and decompositions of changes in measures of income distribu-
tion (inequality, poverty, and richness) and based on income data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel, we compute to what extent the overall changes in income
distribution result from changes in population structure with respect to household
composition.
Irrespective of the choice of methodology, it appears that the changing struc-
ture of German population with respect to household composition during the pe-
riod between 1991 and 2007 is associated with increasing values for all indices of
inequality, poverty, and richness under consideration. Without the demographic
trend towards smaller households inequality, poverty, and richness would also have
increased. But the levels would be tremendously lower than they actually are. Even
the rest could not be exclusively attributed to a declining bargaining power of the
unions but also to changes in the distribution of human capital as well as changes in
occupational choices, see Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2001); Hyslop and
Mar´ e (2005)). Investigating these factors is left to future research.
It turns out that the re-weighting approach and the decomposition reveal sim-
ilar results for inequality, while the results for poverty and richness partly diﬀer
substantially. Hence, when looking at the income distribution as a whole the choice
of methodology does not matter, while it does so at the tails of the distribution. In
addition, we state that the eﬀect of demographic change on income distribution is
lower for post ﬁsc than for pre ﬁsc incomes, since we ﬁnd much greater proportions
25of the demographic eﬀect in cases of the latter. This means, the tax beneﬁt system
in Germany provides – at least implicitly – some form of compensation for changing
household structure. However, one could also argue that the fact that the German
tax-beneﬁt system compensated for most demographic change based increase in in-
equality, poverty, and richness itself has an eﬀect on the demographic trend. So,
as far as one can think of a causal relationship anyway, this could be reverse. In
this context, it is not implausible to think of household formation as an endoge-
nous process which is partly shaped by incentives provided by macro conditions and
tax-beneﬁt systems.14 However, analyzing this is beyond the scope of this paper.
In summary, we conclude that the rise in income inequality is not a well suited
argument for wage claims. A public policy aiming at reducing the income gap should
rather consider strategies that allow for a better compatibility of family and work
in order to alleviate labor force participation for parents.
14 For instance, the reform measures concerning German labor market policy in 2005 (the so-
called “Hartz” reforms) generated incentives for young unemployed adults to leave their parents’
house earlier in order to receive a certain social beneﬁt (or at least a higher amount). However, these
incentives were reduced by legislation in 2006. Gallie and Paugam (2000) and Klasen and Woolard
(2009) among others deal with this issue in European and developing countries respectively.
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32Table 3: Inequality decomposition 1991–2007
income region I1991
0 I2007
0 ∆I0 A B C D B+C
∆I0
household structure and employment status
pre ﬁsc Germany 0.500 0.625 25.027 15.973 11.800 7.596 -10.148 77.500
(0.010) (0.011) (3.542) (2.274) (1.211) (0.973) (1.716) (8.150)
West 0.480 0.558 16.284 15.892 7.982 5.542 -12.870 83.052
(0.012) (0.012) (4.042) (2.658) (1.210) (1.048) (1.836) (16.407)
East 0.514 0.872 69.567 15.711 28.931 23.860 -0.584 75.885
(0.022) (0.024) (8.524) (3.743) (3.154) (3.097) (3.691) (5.311)
post ﬁsc Germany 0.105 0.144 37.755 28.917 5.354 3.024 0.560 22.189
(0.002) (0.004) (4.463) (3.991) (0.682) (0.586) (1.415) (2.851)
West 0.104 0.149 42.990 35.679 4.689 2.145 0.564 15.896
(0.003) (0.004) (5.268) (4.635) (0.694) (0.656) (1.508) (2.248)
East 0.070 0.097 38.801 44.055 -0.731 7.239 -16.178 16.773
(0.002) (0.003) (6.022) (4.886) (1.639) (1.938) (2.479) (8.656)
household structure only
pre ﬁsc Germany 0.500 0.625 25.027 9.015 14.997 0.380 0.638 61.439
(0.010) (0.011) (3.530) (2.860) (1.243) (0.110) (0.508) (7.659)
West 0.480 0.558 16.284 3.704 11.489 0.417 0.702 73.118
(0.012) (0.012) (4.040) (3.430) (1.221) (0.131) (0.569) (18.986)
East 0.514 0.872 69.567 35.308 34.034 1.071 -0.781 50.462
(0.022) (0.024) (8.597) (6.383) (3.289) (0.312) (1.476) (5.618)
post ﬁsc Germany 0.105 0.144 37.755 29.430 5.394 1.161 1.713 17.363
(0.002) (0.004) (4.552) (4.354) (0.587) (0.287) (1.053) (2.047)
West 0.104 0.149 42.990 34.792 4.413 1.293 2.485 13.274
(0.003) (0.004) (5.364) (5.149) (0.574) (0.347) (1.250) (1.782)
East 0.070 0.097 38.801 38.093 4.393 3.736 -6.753 20.951
(0.002) (0.003) (6.036) (6.329) (1.709) (0.668) (2.138) (6.049)
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (500 replications). Results
for ∆I0 and B+C
∆I0 are displayed as percentages. Results for A–D are displayed as percentage points. See Footnote 10.
Results are based on the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale.
33Table 4: Inequality decomposition 1991–2007: results per group (household
structure only)
income k adults children Ak Bk Ck Dk
Bk+Ck
∆I0
pre 1 1 no -9.138 9.825 8.649 -1.032 73.815
(2.146) (1.412) (1.198) (0.442) (11.902)
2 1 yes 2.548 0.936 2.007 1.154 11.758
(0.374) (0.284) (0.583) (0.205) (3.528)
3 2 no 5.144 8.667 10.725 0.083 77.484
(1.850) (1.198) (1.492) (0.071) (13.793)
4 2 yes 7.018 -2.838 -13.701 0.415 -66.084
(0.673) (0.328) (1.518) (0.105) (9.531)
5 ≥3 no 2.032 -1.447 -6.510 0.004 -31.794
(0.424) (0.205) (0.928) (0.127) (5.514)
6 ≥3 yes 1.411 -0.146 -0.790 0.013 -3.740
(0.209) (0.129) (0.697) (0.012) (3.428)
Total – – 9.015 14.997 0.380 0.638 61.439
(2.860) (1.243) (0.110) (0.508) (7.659)
post 1 1 no 3.467 6.493 40.258 -1.123 123.825
(3.306) (0.996) (5.692) (0.507) (20.629)
2 1 yes -1.755 1.005 9.920 0.898 28.937
(0.433) (0.296) (2.834) (0.532) (8.287)
3 2 no 10.722 6.932 51.223 3.917 154.030
(2.474) (0.997) (7.389) (0.668) (27.263)
4 2 yes 10.533 -6.042 -64.943 -2.301 -188.014
(1.389) (0.666) (6.888) (0.258) (26.354)
5 ≥3 no 5.600 -2.628 -30.780 0.332 -88.485
(0.846) (0.363) (4.146) (0.259) (15.051)
6 ≥3 yes 0.862 -0.365 -4.517 -0.010 -12.930
(0.350) (0.266) (3.293) (0.111) (9.500)
Total – – 29.430 5.394 1.161 1.713 17.363
(4.354) (0.587) (0.287) (1.053) (2.047)
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (500 replications).
Results for
Bk+Ck
∆I0 are displayed as percentages. Results for Ak–Dk are displayed as percentage points.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Table 6: Poverty and richness decomposition 1991–2007 for post ﬁsc income
α P 1991
α P 2007
α ∆Pα A B B/∆Pα
household structure and employment status
Poverty HC 0.115 0.141 22.602 5.628 16.974 75.101
(0.003) (0.004) (5.091) (4.697) (2.000) (18.493)
1 0.024 0.033 36.355 15.452 20.903 57.498
(0.001) (0.001) (7.757) (6.785) (2.666) (12.234)
2 0.008 0.012 47.238 23.474 23.764 50.307
(0.000) (0.001) (11.477) (10.132) (3.334) (13.983)
β R1991
β R2007
β ∆Rβ A B B/∆Rβ
Richness 1 0.011 0.019 76.062 74.621 1.441 1.895
(0.001) (0.001) (11.513) (12.016) (1.896) (2.433)
3 0.023 0.039 65.751 65.034 0.718 1.092
(0.001) (0.001) (9.654) (10.105) (1.752) (2.548)
HC 0.056 0.081 46.623 47.043 -0.419 -0.899
(0.002) (0.002) (7.124) (7.384) (1.494) (3.162)
household structure only
Poverty HC 0.115 0.141 22.602 14.116 8.485 37.543
(0.003) (0.004) (5.081) (4.673) (1.238) (8.808)
1 0.024 0.033 36.355 23.145 13.210 36.337
(0.001) (0.001) (7.746) (6.890) (1.843) (7.690)
2 0.008 0.012 47.238 30.342 16.895 35.767
(0.000) (0.001) (11.472) (10.130) (2.425) (9.442)
β R1991
β R2007
β ∆Rβ A B B/∆Rβ
Richness 1 0.011 0.019 76.062 70.404 5.658 7.439
(0.001) (0.001) (11.574) (11.624) (1.244) (1.886)
3 0.023 0.039 65.751 60.716 5.036 7.659
(0.001) (0.001) (9.675) (9.739) (1.146) (1.973)
HC 0.056 0.081 46.623 42.424 4.200 9.008
(0.002) (0.002) (7.111) (7.124) (1.008) (2.525)
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (500 replica-
tions). Results for ∆Pα and B/∆Pα are displayed as percentages. Results for A and B are displayed
as percentage points. See Footnote 10. Results are based on the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale.
36Table 7: Poverty and richness decomposition 1991–2007 for post
ﬁsc income: results per group (household structure only)





Poverty 1 1 no -1.576 8.632 38.193
(2.560) (1.249) (9.764)
2 1 yes 1.739 3.740 16.548
(0.994) (1.087) (5.403)
3 2 no -0.035 4.126 18.257
(1.923) (0.599) (5.500)
4 2 yes 5.477 -5.917 -26.180
(1.949) (0.646) (6.832)
5 ≥3 no 3.769 -1.592 -7.043
(0.925) (0.248) (2.055)
6 ≥3 yes 4.743 -0.504 -2.232
(1.082) (0.373) (1.940)
Total – – 14.116 8.485 37.543
(4.673) (1.238) (8.808)
Richness 1 1 no 2.602 4.225 9.061
(2.767) (0.659) (1.964)
2 1 yes -1.343 0.247 0.530
(0.562) (0.127) (0.277)
3 2 no 18.362 10.435 22.382
(4.277) (1.527) (4.258)
4 2 yes 20.034 -6.082 -13.046
(3.025) (0.733) (2.239)
5 ≥3 no 5.711 -4.307 -9.239
(2.151) (0.669) (1.905)
6 ≥3 yes -2.942 -0.317 -0.680
(0.991) (0.236) (0.515)
Total – – 42.424 4.200 9.008
(7.124) (1.008) (2.525)
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Bootstrapped standard errors in paren-
theses (500 replications). Results for
Bk
∆P0 are displayed as percentages. Results for
Ak and Bk are displayed as percentage points. See Footnote 10. Results are based
on the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale.
37Table 8: Actual and re-weighted changes of inequality, poverty, and
richness measures 1991–2007
pre ﬁsc post ﬁsc
measure ∆act ∆rew ∆act−∆rew
∆act ∆act ∆rew ∆act−∆rew
∆act
IGini 18.39 9.16 50.21 16.14 12.45 22.85
(1.44) (1.26) (3.21) (1.65) (1.53) (2.54)
I0 25.03 4.97 80.14 37.76 28.82 23.67
(3.59) (2.92) (9.42) (4.46) (3.91) (2.54)
I1 39.97 20.69 48.24 54.24 43.11 20.51
(5.45) (4.24) (3.90) (10.34) (8.47) (2.75)
I2 107.12 66.74 37.70 187.16 148.65 20.58
(37.28) (26.45) (4.11) (81.27) (65.29) (3.14)
post ﬁsc incomes
poverty richness
P0/R0 22.60 10.65 52.87 46.62 40.26 13.64
(5.11) (4.52) (13.06) (7.20) (7.24) (4.58)
P1/R3 36.36 21.08 42.03 65.75 56.79 13.63
(7.74) (6.95) (9.28) (9.69) (9.54) (2.93)
P2/R1 47.24 29.44 37.68 76.06 65.90 13.36
(11.48) (10.22) (10.65) (11.54) (11.36) (2.85)
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (500
replications). Note that the results for actual (∆act) and re-weighted changes (∆rew) as well
as the term ∆act−∆rew
∆act are displayed as percentages, i.e. they were multiplied by 100. Results
are based on the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale.
38Figure 1: Household size, inequality, poverty, and richness (Germany 1991–2007)
Figure 2: Number of diﬀerent-sized households (Germany 1991–2008)
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